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In recent years, a lively debate has erupted over whether and how int rculturalism differs from 
multiculturalism as a response to cultu al diversity (for example, Meer, Modood, & Zapata-Barrero 2016; 
Barrett 2013; Meer & Modood 2012; Kymlicka 2012; Levey 2012; Taylor 2012; Wieviorka 2012; Bouchard 
2011). An influential argument in this debate is that multiculturalism itself militates against intercultural 
dialogue (ICD) (for example, Zapata-Barrero 2015; Cantle 2012; Council of Europe 2008). In this article, 
I want to scrutinise this argument and challenge its pplicability in the Australian context.
Australia helped to pioneer multicultural policy along with Canada in the 1970s and 1980s, a policy t has 
maintained.2 Superficially, the Australian case might seem to support the contention that multiculturalist 
regimes inhibit ICD, as the latter has scar ely figured in the Australian national expe ience. Even the term 
“intercultural dialogue” has little resonance in public affairs. The government consults a wide range of 
stakeholders, including minorities, when fashioning policy. However, there is little inclination or appetite 
for a serious, sustained and genuinely open engagement with cultural minorities on issues that directly 
1 This article is a revised version of Geoffrey Brahm Levey (2017) ‘Intercultural dialogue under a multiculturalism regime: 
pitfalls and possibilities in Australia’ in Fethi Mansouri (ed) Interculturalism at the crossroads: comparative perspectives on 
concepts, policies and practice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, France, pp. 103-25.
2  At least until March 2017 when the Turnbull government launched a new national multicultural policy statement (DSS 
2017). The new policy stresses the importance of inclusion and a sense of belonging for all Australians. However, unlike the 
previous national multicultural policy statements, the Turnbull policy places most of the onus on immigrants and minorities 
to adjust to Australian life. It scarcely addresses the measures that government and public institutions will take to be more 
accommodating of cultural diversity and the needs of minorities. In another first, the new multicultural policy avoids using 
the word “multiculturalism”.
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affect them and their place in the Australian society, notwithstanding the almost 40-year commitment to 
state multiculturalism.
I argue that the paucity of ICD in Australia at the governmental level can be traced to the indifferent 
attitude of “Anglo-Australia” towards minorities. My contention is that ICD would be both possible and 
positive for policy outcomes if the terms of Australian multiculturalism were actually respected. To support 
these arguments, I analyse two prominent cases in recent political history. The first is the 2006 clash between 
John Howard’s conservative government and the Ethnic Communities’ Council of Victoria (ECCV) over the 
introduction of a citizenship test. The second case concerns the attempt by Tony Abbott’s conservative 
government during 2013–14 to reform the anti-vilification provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth). The cases highlight how Australia’s multiculturalism regime is circumvented in avoiding ICD.
1  Why the Paucity of ICD in Australia?
Two very different arguments have been put as to why multiculturalism works against ICD. According to 
one account, multiculturalism as a public philosophy and policy has this effect because it treats cultural 
minorities as discrete communities mainly interested in their own identity preservation. Although such an 
approach may have made sense in the post-war decades when cultural communities were concerned with 
resisting the pressures of assimilation, these conditions, so goes the argument, no longer apply. In today’s 
globalised world, which includes mass travel and instantaneous communications, what is needed instead 
is a model that allows for cosmopolitan interests and attachments, where cultural-group members, who 
are open and forward-looking rather than culturally blinkered by their pasts, can interact, exchange and 
dialogue with diverse others. In a word, what is needed is “interculturalism” rather than multiculturalism 
(Cantle 2012; Zapata-Barrero 2015).
This interculturalist critique of multiculturalism is unconvincing. For one thing, it overlooks versions 
of multiculturalism that stress ICD (for example, Parekh 1996, 2000). However, it also misses the mark 
regarding the Australian experience. Even in its early years, when the tendency was to construe ethnic 
minorities as discrete communities, Australia’s multicultural policy did not preclude interaction between 
cultural minorities. To take one example, the Ethnic Communities’ Councils of Australia in each state 
of Australia was among the first non-government institutions established to advance the multicultural 
agenda in Australia. The Councils comprised representatives of all ethnic groups that wished to participate. 
Nor has Australian multiculturalism boxed people into their ethnic, religious or linguistic group heritage. 
Australian multicultural policy has always been highly individualistic. The rights to cultural identity and 
respect and to access and equity apply to individual Australians, however, they define and practice (or 
not) their cultural identities. As the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia puts it, “Fundamentally, 
multiculturalism is about the rights of the individual” (OMA 1989, p. 15). Individuals are free to identify 
themselves with their cultural heritage groups, assimilate into the mainstream or forge hybrid identities 
and patterns of identification. Interaction and dialogue with diverse others is a standard operating 
procedure among individual Australians.
A second line of criticism is that multiculturalism is based on an unhelpful majority/minority 
dichotomy. The Council of Europe’s (2008, p. 18) White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue contends that 
although multiculturalism “was ostensibly a radical departure from assimilationism”, it “in fact … 
frequently shared the same, schematic conception of society set in opposition of majority and minority, 
differing only in endorsing separation of the minority from the majority rather than assimilation to it”. This 
observation takes us a step closer to the heart of the matter. Australian multiculturalism is formulated on 
the basis of a dominant cultural majority – typically, dubbed Anglo-Australians or Anglo-Celts – and the 
rest, a plethora of minorities. All five national multicultural policy statements reference the foundational 
institutions and culture based on British heritage and and/or European settlement, Torres Strait Islanders 
and their distinct experience as the original and dispossessed inhabitants and the large and growing 
proportion of the population who are immigrants or the children of immigrants, many from non-English-
speaking backgrounds (OMA 1989; Commonwealth of Australia 1999, 2003; DIAC 2011; DSS 2017).
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Neither multiculturalism nor Australia’s particular version of it is, however, the problem in this 
respect. First, not every iteration of multiculturalism is based on a majority/minority dichotomy. Much 
multicultural theory argues for broad parity or even-handedness in state recognition and accommodation 
across all constituent groups in a society (for example, Bader 2007; Carens 2000; Fraser 2002; Young 1990). 
Bouchard (2011, p. 463) notes that federal Canada’s policy of multiculturalism officially operates on a 
“diversity” paradigm that does not recognise a majority culture and instead places all constituent groups 
and individuals on an equal footing. Rather, he says, it is Quebec’s interculturalism policy that endorses 
a “duality” paradigm that sanctions a foundational majority culture and “ad hoc majority precedence” 
(Bouchard 2011). The Canadian case, in other words, exhibits the very opposite terminological situation to 
that asserted by the Council of Europe. It is clear that the labels “multiculturalism” and “interculturalism” 
have highly variable and contextual meanings (Levey 2012, 2016; Meer & Modood 2012). Treating these 
labels as though they represent fixed and contrasting approaches to cultural diversity is bound to be 
misleading.
Second, Australian multiculturalism has always sought to sensitise “Anglo-Australia” to the necessity 
of understanding and being responsive to Australia’s minorities. For example, an early policy discussion 
paper, “Multiculturalism for All Australians: Our Developing Nationhood”, observed that if Australia’s 
core institutions are to be relevant to all Australians, then “they will sometimes have to go out of their 
way to understand the diverse cultural backgrounds of the many groups comprising Australian society” 
(ACPEA 1982, p. 16). The architects of Australian multiculturalism understood that intercultural exchange 
is essential for building inclusive relations because, without it, one is unlikely to appreciate what is even 
at issue or how one may be undermining positive relations, despite one’s best intentions.
Bouchard’s suggestion of looking beyond the labels to the underlying paradigms at work is more 
pertinent. Some multiculturalism and some interculturalism operate on a duality paradigm involving an 
established majority and culture and then the rest of the population. However, even this paradigmatic level 
only takes us so far in explaining national differences. If both Quebec’s and Australia’s cultural diversity 
policies are predicated on a majority/minority duality, why is it that Quebec has proved comparatively 
open to and adept at ICD, whereas Australia has not?
The paucity of ICD in Australia’s dealings with its minorities is not attributable to its multicultural 
policy. Nor can it be explained simply in terms of there being an underlying majority/minority duality 
governing Australia’s approach to cultural diversity. Rather, the paucity of ICD is a corollary of how the 
dominant cultural majority goes about exercising its dominance. This is an attitudinal matter with deep 
historical, cultural and institutional underpinnings. Australian multiculturalism was intended to combat 
and civilise these longstanding attitudes and practices. That they still prevail is testimony not to the 
effect of multicultural policy but to its limitations in the face of entrenched cultural patterns and political 
interests.
There is no shortage of examples. Multicultural policy proclaims, and Australian governments stress, 
the importance of all Australians respecting the country’s democratic traditions and institutions. John 
Howard’s conservative government was telling Muslims in 2005 that they must abide by democratic 
norms, and yet, at the same time, it was also telling the Muslim and indigenous communities who among 
their number would represent them in their dealings with government (DIMA 2006; Kuhn 2009; Shaw 
2004). Not exactly a lesson in democratic representation, let alone an ICD. In 2008, Kevin Rudd’s Labor 
government convened a national summit designed to bring together 2000 of Australia’s best and brightest 
individuals to discuss future directions for the nation. This plan did not stop the Prime Minister from 
scheduling the summit on the first days of the festival of Passover, thus ensuring that many of the Jewish 
Australians invited could not participate in the discussions (Australian Jewish News 2008). It is almost as 
if multicultural policy did not exist.
Let us consider two cases in some detail. The first is the 2006 clash between the Howard government 
and the ECCV over the proposed introduction of a citizenship test. The second case concerns the failed 
attempt by the Abbott Coalition government in 2013–14 to reform the anti-vilification provisions of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The first case reveals how a pretence of dialogue quickly deteriorates 
into a pointless spat when there is little trust in the government’s bona fides and when parties to the 
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dialogue resort to loose language and fail to respect the ground rules of Australian multiculturalism. The 
second case reveals a government wholly uninterested in seriously dialoguing about a major reform that 
is overwhelmingly opposed by minorities and the public at large and which results in the government’s 
humiliating defeat. The cases are instructive in identifying not only the difficulties but also the importance 
of conducting ICD in Australia.
2  Case Study 1: The Howard government’s stoush with the ECCV
The background to the case is as follows. On 17 September 2006, the Parliamentary Secretary for 
Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship, Andrew Robb, released a discussion paper, “Australian Citizenship: 
Much More Than a Ceremony”, to seek the Australian community’s views on the merits of introducing 
a formal citizenship test (Commonwealth of Australia 2006). The paper sought comment on a range of 
questions having to do with the need for, and nature of, such a test, including facility in English language 
and familiarity with Australia’s values and way of life. On the face of it, this seemed a promising initial step 
towards the public and ICD.
The ECCV (2006a) submitted its responses to these questions on 15 November 2006. It argued that the 
case for change had not been made; that the proposed reforms were discriminatory, especially in relation 
to refugees from Africa; and that the government’s stress on “Australian values” was bogus. In an address 
to a conference later that month, Parliamentary Secretary Robb took exception to the ECCV’s position, 
characterising it as “essentially a separatist view” (Robb 2006a). The ECCV (2006b) issued a media release 
the same day rejecting this characterisation and contending that Robb had misunderstood their position. 
Two days later, the ECCV’s Executive Officer Peter van Vliet (2006) rounded on the Howard government 
and its proposed citizenship test in an opinion piece in a Melbourne newspaper. The “dialogue” between 
the ECCV and the government, such as it was, never recovered from this point.
The episode is salutary because both parties diminished public debate and undermined ICD by 
conflating positions and engaging in unwarranted provocations. Moreover, both the government’s and 
the ECCV’s positions failed to respect the terms of Australian multiculturalism. Before I defend these 
contentions, some broader context is required.
First, Prime Minister Howard was well known as an arch opponent of multiculturalism. After assuming 
power in 1996, for several years, Howard could not bring himself even to say the word multiculturalism 
(Kelly 1997). Although the Howard government nominally continued multicultural policy, a number of 
institutions (such as the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research) were abolished 
and funding was reduced. The 2003 policy statement, Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity, was a 
mere five pages long and suggested a government going through the motions (Commonwealth of Australia 
2003). There was a palpable sense that it was only a matter of time before the Howard government would 
recant on multiculturalism.
That time came in late 2006 in the wake, secondly, of international developments. Following a spate 
of Islamist terror attacks abroad and reassessments of multiculturalism and general concerns about 
the integration of especially Muslims in Britain and the Netherlands, the Howard government signalled 
its intention to drop the word “multiculturalism” from government use (Robb 2006a). In January 2007, 
for example, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs was renamed the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship. In addition, the residency eligibility period for acquiring citizenship was 
extended from two to four years.
The government’s proposed citizenship test was thus widely perceived as being part of Howard’s move 
against multiculturalism. In this light, the government’s discussion paper exploring a citizenship test 
takes on a different hue. Was the government genuinely seeking to consult the public and stakeholders on 
the idea? Or was the discussion paper rather a public relations exercise to “sell” a reform that had already 
been finalised and to which it was already committed? The paper itself observes the best bureaucratic 
protocols of the genre: the language is inquisitive, searching and tentative. It concludes with a useful 
survey of citizenship tests and procedures that other comparator countries have adopted.
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humiliating defeat. The cases are instructive in identifying not only the difficulties but also the importance 
of conducting ICD in Australia.
2  Case Study 1: The Howard government’s stoush with the ECCV
The background to the case is as follows. On 17 September 2006, the Parliamentary Secretary for 
Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship, Andrew Robb, released a discussion paper, “Australian Citizenship: 
Much More Than a Ceremony”, to seek the Australian community’s views on the merits of introducing 
a formal citizenship test (Commonwealth of Australia 2006). The paper sought comment on a range of 
questions having to do with the need for, and nature of, such a test, including facility in English language 
and familiarity with Australia’s values and way of life. On the face of it, this seemed a promising initial step 
towards the public and ICD.
The ECCV (2006a) submitted its responses to these questions on 15 November 2006. It argued that the 
case for change had not been made; that the proposed reforms were discriminatory, especially in relation 
to refugees from Africa; and that the government’s stress on “Australian values” was bogus. In an address 
to a conference later that month, Parliamentary Secretary Robb took exception to the ECCV’s position, 
characterising it as “essentially a separatist view” (Robb 2006a). The ECCV (2006b) issued a media release 
the same day rejecting this characterisation and contending that Robb had misunderstood their position. 
Two days later, the ECCV’s Executive Officer Peter van Vliet (2006) rounded on the Howard government 
and its proposed citizenship test in an opinion piece in a Melbourne newspaper. The “dialogue” between 
the ECCV and the government, such as it was, never recovered from this point.
The episode is salutary because both parties diminished public debate and undermined ICD by 
conflating positions and engaging in unwarranted provocations. Moreover, both the government’s and 
the ECCV’s positions failed to respect the terms of Australian multiculturalism. Before I defend these 
contentions, some broader context is required.
First, Prime Minister Howard was well known as an arch opponent of multiculturalism. After assuming 
power in 1996, for several years, Howard could not bring himself even to say the word multiculturalism 
(Kelly 1997). Although the Howard government nominally continued multicultural policy, a number of 
institutions (such as the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research) were abolished 
and funding was reduced. The 2003 policy statement, Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity, was a 
mere five pages long and suggested a government going through the motions (Commonwealth of Australia 
2003). There was a palpable sense that it was only a matter of time before the Howard government would 
recant on multiculturalism.
That time came in late 2006 in the wake, secondly, of international developments. Following a spate 
of Islamist terror attacks abroad and reassessments of multiculturalism and general concerns about 
the integration of especially Muslims in Britain and the Netherlands, the Howard government signalled 
its intention to drop the word “multiculturalism” from government use (Robb 2006a). In January 2007, 
for example, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs was renamed the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship. In addition, the residency eligibility period for acquiring citizenship was 
extended from two to four years.
The government’s proposed citizenship test was thus widely perceived as being part of Howard’s move 
against multiculturalism. In this light, the government’s discussion paper exploring a citizenship test 
takes on a different hue. Was the government genuinely seeking to consult the public and stakeholders on 
the idea? Or was the discussion paper rather a public relations exercise to “sell” a reform that had already 
been finalised and to which it was already committed? The paper itself observes the best bureaucratic 
protocols of the genre: the language is inquisitive, searching and tentative. It concludes with a useful 
survey of citizenship tests and procedures that other comparator countries have adopted.
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Barely a month after the release of the discussion paper, however, the Parliamentary Secretary gave a 
different impression. In an address to the Jewish National Fund in Melbourne, Robb responded to common 
criticisms of the proposal and otherwise made the case for the new test (Robb 2006b). This was expected. 
Robb even advanced the debate, I think, by effectively rebutting a few criticisms of the proposal. To the 
argument “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”, Robb replied that the “system is not ‘broke’ because we have 
continually sought to improve it”. To the complaint that many migrants to Australia have become good 
citizens with little fluency in English, Robb noted how that incontrovertible fact is connected to labour 
conditions in the 1950s and 1960s, when migrants mainly filled unskilled and labour-intensive industries. 
The Australia of today, he retorted, is a service-based economy that requires English facility to secure 
employment and advance (Robb 2006b).
The problem lay with Robb’s concluding remarks. Early in his address, he was careful to stress that 
the “proposed formal citizenship test … is the subject of a discussion paper and public consultations at the 
present time”. However, the concluding section states the benefits of a citizenship test in such unequivocal 
terms that it presents the option of not proceeding with the proposal as morally and politically irresponsible. 
Robb left little doubt that the government was committed to a citizenship test and had decided its format 
ahead of the public consultations.
The ECCV entered the public debate a few weeks later on 15 November 2006 (ECCV 2006a). Its main 
concern, it said, was that the proposed citizenship test would unfairly burden migrants from non-English-
speaking backgrounds and, especially, refugees from Africa. The concern was a reasonable one. Early data 
suggested that the failure rate of the test within its first year was higher than 20 per cent, with refugees 
and people from non-English-speaking backgrounds faring even worse (Butterly 2008). Although rates 
soon improved to less than 4 per cent failing overall on the first attempt, there remained considerable 
variation based on national origin (Anderson 2015). Most of the ECCV’s fire was directed, however, at the 
government’s account of Australian values. The discussion paper lists these values as including respect 
for the freedom and dignity of the individual, support for democracy, commitment to the rule of law, 
equality of men and women, the spirit of a fair go and mutual respect, and compassion to those in need 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2006, p. 11). The ECCV understood this list as suggesting that the underlying 
premise of the discussion paper is that Australia is a monocultural society with “one overriding culture”, a 
phrase that Robb invoked in his foreword to the paper. The ECCV said that they endorsed only democracy, 
the rule of law and Australia as “our shared homeland”. They would not ascribe Australian value status to 
respect for the individual, equality and a fair go and mutual respect (ECCV 2006a).
The ECCV’s reservations about some of the claimed core Australian values are hard to fathom. The core 
Australian values listed in the discussion paper are almost identical to the core values and institutions 
specified in Australia’s successive multicultural policies, namely, reciprocity, tolerance and equality 
(including of the sexes), freedom of speech and religion, the rule of law, the Constitution, parliamentary 
democracy and English as the national language (Commonwealth of Australia 1999, 2003; DIAC 2011; OMA 
1989). Yet the ECCV had never before objected to this list of values and now claimed to be upholding 
Australian multiculturalism against a perceived attack by the government. The ECCV bracketed “respect for 
the individual” because it “draws on Western liberal traditions”. They said that such a value is problematic 
because the discussion paper ignores “social democratic or communitarian values which are also part of 
Western liberal and democratic traditions” (ECCV 2006a). It is unclear why a fair go, equality, mutual respect 
and compassion for the needy do not count as social democratic values. It is also unclear how rejecting 
this subset of the listed core values can be reconciled with the ECCV’s concern about discrimination and 
the plight of refugees.
The ECCV objects to a fair go and mutual respect on the grounds that they are “hardly Australian 
values”, being rather “universal values found in a vast array of nations and among different religious 
and secular belief systems”. This observation scarcely explains why these values can or should not also 
be Australian values; the ECCV’s favoured Australian values of democracy and the rule of law are also 
practiced by many other nations.
Seeking to engage in a public dialogue over the proposed citizenship test is commendable. However, 
the ECCV’s curious stance on Australian values allowed the government to avoid confronting its own 
16    Geoffrey Brahm Levey6    Geoffrey Brahm Levey
contortions regarding Australian multiculturalism. The Parliamentary Secretary quickly accused the ECCV 
of “separatism”: “When a group as prominent as the Ethnic Communities Council of Victoria rejects, in 
the name of multiculturalism, the notion of an overriding Australian culture based around a core set of 
values we have a problem because this is essentially a separatist view” (Robb 2006a). In fact, for all its 
incoherence, the ECCV’s position strains the meaning of separatism. They were not arguing for secession or 
self-government; they were endorsing the same democratic system and the same law for the same country. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine how a body like the ECCV could be separatist, a point made by the ECCV 
(2006b) in its reply to Robb. The organisation is law abiding and participates in the social, cultural and 
political life of Australia. It represents dozens of community groups, themselves representing hundreds of 
thousands of Australian individuals who are also immersed in, and committed to, the life and institutions 
of the country as it is presently constituted.
The charge of separatism was not the only instance of loose language used by the Parliamentary 
Secretary. In his address to the 2006 Transformations Conference at the Australian National University, 
Robb (2006a) had much to say about community, core values, citizenship, Australian national identity and 
Australian culture. Unfortunately, much of what he had to say collapsed these notions into each other, as 
if they all amounted to the same thing. They do not.
At the heart of Robb’s position is a legitimate concern of any democratic state, namely, national and 
social integration. He worried that the term multiculturalism has been misinterpreted or misappropriated by 
some groups as sanctioning “separate development, a federation of ethnic cultures, not one community”. 
One might argue that this worry is misplaced in the Australian case. Although it may have a basis in Britain, 
the Netherlands and perhaps some other places, Australia has a far more selective immigration program 
(Hartwich 2011), as Robb himself acknowledged. Moreover, ever since the inception of multiculturalism, 
Australian governments have recognised that many Australians do not much understand it. Previously, 
their response had been a renewed commitment to better explain and promote the policy. People rightly 
wondered why some misunderstanding of multiculturalism in the community should suddenly require the 
word, if not the policy, to be dumped.
However, here I want to put aside these points to simply grant the in-principle interest of democratic 
states in political and social integration. My concern is how this valid point gets lost amid careless language 
and allusions. For example, Robb’s legitimate objection to “separate development” and a “federation of 
ethnic cultures” becomes elsewhere in his address an objection to the emergence of a “community of 
communities” in Australia. Yet, Australia has been a community of communities for a very long time. How 
could it be not given the ethnic, linguistic, national and religious diversity of the country’s inhabitants? 
One only needs to review the list of organisations that responded to the discussion paper, a veritable 
cross-section of Australia’s multicultural society. Australia is certainly not a federation of ethnic cultures 
(although Victorians like to argue that New South Welshmen are culturally challenged). Nor is Australia 
only a community of communities; it is also a national community comprising individual citizens with 
multiple and varied interests and memberships. However, self-evidently Australia is also a community of 
a vast array of communities.
Denying this much unhelpfully raises the stakes of what Australia might otherwise be. Soon after the 
denial, the Parliamentary Secretary told his audience that “Australia has successfully combined people 
into one family with one overriding culture, based on a common set of values” (Robb 2006a). The ECCV 
was exercised by this reference to an “overriding culture”, which, as noted, figured also in Robb’s foreword 
to the discussion paper and which the ECCV equated with a “monocultural” society. To me, the word 
“overriding” implies the legitimate existence of other cultures. What is troubling is describing Australians 
as “one family”. This is loose language commissioned to do political work. It implies a kind of relationship 
and degree of integration that is inappropriate for a liberal democratic political community. If Australians 
are one family, what are they doing marrying each other? The Howard government was concerned that 
all Australians should be proficient in English. All of us should be concerned how the government and 
others use and abuse the English language in these debates. Australia is not a federation of ethnic cultures, 
nor should it be. It is not one family, nor could it be. It is a community of communities; how could it not 
be? Finally, it is also something more than a community of communities: it is a national community of 
individual citizens.
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denial, the Parliamentary Secretary told his audience that “Australia has successfully combined people 
into one family with one overriding culture, based on a common set of values” (Robb 2006a). The ECCV 
was exercised by this reference to an “overriding culture”, which, as noted, figured also in Robb’s foreword 
to the discussion paper and which the ECCV equated with a “monocultural” society. To me, the word 
“overriding” implies the legitimate existence of other cultures. What is troubling is describing Australians 
as “one family”. This is loose language commissioned to do political work. It implies a kind of relationship 
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What, then, of Robb’s “overriding culture” and “shared national identity”? Invoking “culture”, let alone 
an overriding one, in the context of a citizenship test is bound to provoke stakeholders in a multicultural 
polity. However, one should not get too precious about such a term. Liberal democratic institutions and 
values can also be construed as constituting a certain culture. If by an “overriding culture” Robb meant 
the core Australian values as specified in multicultural policy – which is how he elaborated the phrase 
in his foreword to the discussion paper – he was not saying anything new or particularly controversial in 
the Australian context. The trouble is that the discussion paper proper seemed to enlarge the idea of core 
values.
The slide from a core set of values based on liberal democratic norms and institutions (as stipulated in 
multicultural policy) to Anglo-Australian cultural patterns and way of life is almost imperceptible if one is 
not alert to the significance of the distinction. The discussion paper identifies “themes on which applicants 
are tested in other countries”, including “customs and traditions” (Commonwealth of Australia 2006, p. 
12). It neglects to clarify that for Australia’s main comparator nations – Britain, Canada and the United 
States – the customs and traditions tested are typically civic in nature, such as public holidays, historical 
commemorations and national symbols, or, in Britain’s case, also practical information for “getting by” 
(A previous British citizenship test asked a multiple-choice question about what one should do if one 
accidently knocks over a patron’s beer in a pub.). The discussion paper then asks whether prospective 
Australian citizens should have to demonstrate some knowledge of “Australian culture and traditions” as 
distinct from Australian history, national symbols and system of democracy (Commonwealth of Australia 
2006, p. 13).
In his subsequent public addresses, Robb reinforced this impression of an expanded notion of culture 
by variously invoking “the Australian culture” and “Australia’s way of life” (Robb 2006b) and equating an 
overriding culture and core values with the idea of a “shared national identity” (Robb 2006a). National 
identities surely exist and are important, but, as I have written elsewhere, the point about national 
identities is that they are dynamic and develop organically. They cannot be legislated, for the most part, 
without trading in gross caricatures and violating liberal democratic norms (Levey 2008). Least of all can 
a national identity be instilled in people through a general knowledge test.
For almost half a century, Australia followed the example of other liberal democracies and progressively 
redefined Australian citizenship from one of a national cultural community and emotional connection to it 
to one of “proceduralism” and the formal acceptance of rights and obligations (Betts 2002; Betts & Birrell 
2007). In 1986, for example, the requirement in the Australian Oath of Allegiance to state one’s name and 
to renounce all other allegiances was dropped. In 1994, the Oath of Allegiance was replaced in its entirety 
with a Pledge of Commitment as a Citizen, in which reference to the Queen was omitted. The Australian 
Citizenship Amendment Act 2002 (Cth) permitted Australian citizens to acquire other nationalities without 
losing their Australian citizenship and so on. Yet here was the Howard government, in 2006, apparently 
seeking to renationalise citizenship. Indeed the citizenship test that Howard introduced controversially 
included questions on cricket heroes and other Anglo-Australian sporting and cultural icons along with 
questions on Australian political history and institutions (Levey 2014; Tate 2009).
The episode underscores a number of points. First, the Howard government’s discussion paper on 
the citizenship test was less than a genuine attempt at public consultation and dialogue with interested 
parties on this significant reform. The government had clearly already decided on the test and its general 
format. Second, the ECCV was presented a prime opportunity to press the government on departing from 
its proclaimed core set of Australian values in the discussion paper (and in multicultural policy). However, 
the ECCV could not prosecute this case because of its own puzzling and indulgent rejection of this long-
settled list of liberal democratic (and Australian multiculturalism) ground rules. Where the Howard 
government radically expanded the list to include cultural aspects associated with Anglo-Australian icons 
and norms, the ECCV radically eviscerated the list of core Australian values from seven to a skeletal three 
and thereby blew wind into the government’s sails. Finally, Australian multiculturalism was not the cause 
but a victim of this failed attempt at public and ICD.
The Howard government was removed from office less than a year after the introduction of the 
citizenship test. Following a formal review, the Rudd Labor government removed the “cultural questions” 
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from the Australian citizenship test, a situation that prevails to this day, notwithstanding two subsequent 
conservative governments. The Howard government‘s unfortunate and costly approach to citizenship 
reform was entirely avoidable. Had the government been genuinely interested in consulting the public 
and community groups and had the government and some influential ethnic advocacy groups respected 
the liberal democratic terms of Australian multiculturalism, a constructive dialogue about the merits and 
format of a new citizenship test would have been possible.
3  Case Study 2: Abbott Government’s Reform of the Racial Hatred 
Provisions
Our second case study concerns an issue that underwrites the very possibility of public and ICD, namely, 
free speech and its appropriate limits. Freedom of speech is a fundamental right that entitles people to 
express their views and concerns. At the same time, hate speech can intimidate and marginalise individuals 
and groups such that they are or feel themselves to be excluded from the society. Since 1995, Australia has 
balanced these twin concerns with Part 2A of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA). Part 2A of the 
RDA addresses discriminatory action based on racial hatred. It also includes section 18C, which renders 
unlawful behaviour that “offends, insults, humiliates or intimidates” in a discriminatory manner on the 
basis of a specified group characteristic. It also includes the 18D “exemptions” that protect action that is 
done reasonably and in good faith in artistic, scientific, academic or journalistic pursuits in the public 
interest. For some 16 years, these provisions served Australians well and without incident.
The latter changed in 2011. A federal court found conservative columnist Andrew Bolt to have 
breached the race hate laws in two published articles in which he had questioned the identity and motives 
of light-skinned indigenous people (Eatock v Bolt 2011). Abbott, then Liberal party opposition leader and 
a friend of Bolt, denounced the decision and pledged to reform the RDA if elected to govern. Following the 
Abbott Coalition victory in September 2013, the Attorney General Senator George Brandis announced the 
government’s intention to repeal the RDA’s anti-vilification provisions in the name of free speech. Brandis 
stated that he wanted to “re-centre [the] debate so that when people talk about rights, they talk about the 
great liberal democratic rights of freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of worship and 
freedom of the press” (Wright 2013).
The proposed changes to the RDA sparked a public outcry, not least among cultural minorities. Their 
sense of acceptance and belonging in multicultural Australia is still largely tied to the legal protections 
against discrimination. The anti-vilification provisions of the RDA are considered to be a vital extension 
of the principle of nondiscrimination and a public sign of minorities’ social acceptance. As reforming 
Labor Prime Minster Gough Whitlam (1975) proclaimed on its passing into law, “The Racial Discrimination 
Act wrote it firmly into the legislation that Australia is in reality a multicultural nation, in which the 
linguistic and cultural heritage of the Aboriginal people and of peoples from all parts of the world can 
find an honoured place”. For cultural minorities, at stake was the message that a dilution of the federal 
protections would send about their standing in modern Australia; it would throw into question whether 
they still retained “an honoured place”.
Brandis responded to the controversy by appointing an outspoken free-market libertarian, Tim Wilson, 
to the role of Human Rights Commissioner at the Australian Human Rights Commission in December 2013. 
Wilson had once called for the abolition of the Commission as an illegitimate use of state authority. Dubbed 
the “freedom commissioner” by Brandis, his role now was to balance the alleged social justice focus of the 
other commissioners and to prosecute the case for free speech as the most fundamental and cherished of 
all liberties. Wilson assumed the role with zeal, denouncing the protections against non-discrimination 
and of equal opportunity as dangerous “positive liberties” and further antagonising community groups.
The government’s apparent deafness to public and minority group opposition to the proposed reform 
ironically saw leaders from the Greek, Arabic, Chinese, Indigenous, Jewish and other communities 
cooperating and mobilising against the changes like never before. In March 2014, the government 
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circulated a draft of its proposed changes to the RDA for comment and announced that it would hold a 
review on the matter. The exposure draft proposed repealing sections 18C and 18D and replacing them 
with protections against vilification and intimidation on the basis of the race, colour or ethnic or national 
origins of a person or group of persons. However, the meaning of vilification was to be limited to the 
“incitement of hatred” and the meaning of intimidation was confined to causing “fear of physical harm” 
only. Furthermore, whether an act has these effects was to be determined “by the standards of an ordinary 
reasonable member of the Australian community, not by the standards of any particular group within the 
Australian community” (Brandis 2014). Not only was the government indifferent to minorities’ concerns 
about watering down the anti-vilification provisions, now it was proposing to have people who likely had 
never known the hurt of racism decide what racial discrimination is and when it has occurred and to 
specifically exclude from the exercise those who know it best, namely, its routine victims. ICD and minority 
input could hardly have been further sidelined.
In August 2014, it was revealed that more than 76 per cent of the 4100 submissions to the review inquiry 
opposed the government’s draft amendments (Aston 2014a). Days later, the Prime Minister announced 
that his government would no longer pursue changes to the RDA, saying “Leadership is about preserving 
national unity on the essentials and that is why I have taken this position” (Aston 2014b).
For some advocates of the government’s proposed reform, such as the Attorney General, the issue 
was a matter of principle. Free speech, in their view, is simply too fundamental to liberty and democracy 
to be balanced against protection from discriminatory action of any kind. However, other advocates of the 
reform were primarily concerned about the insidious consequences of regulating speech. For them, such 
a regulation makes people overcautious about speaking their mind, introducing a “chilling” effect that 
drains public discourse of authenticity, which in turn undermines democratic legitimacy. This concern 
is the mirror image of the concern that certain kinds of speech can intimidate minority members from 
participating in the society as equals. In either case, is not a full and frank ICD made impossible?
This important issue was lost in the public debate. Those opposed to amending the RDA provisions 
sometimes challenged the reformers by asking, “What is it that you want to say that isn’t already protected 
under section 18D?” (Soutphommasane 2014). It is a fair question, but it does not tackle the issue of the 
chilling effect. Sensing this, Commissioner Wilson (2015) rather unkindly called the question a “party 
trick”. “The question assumes that one wants to say something racist, but that is not so”, he protested. 
As an example, Wilson cited his own self-censorship on hearing the boxer Anthony Mundine say that 
Aboriginality and homosexuality are incompatible according to Aboriginal law. Wilson said that he wanted 
to “harshly criticise” the basis of Mundine’s comment but because of section 18C, he and other non-
Aboriginal Australians “have to cautiously discuss the topic” lest they offend Mundine’s “ethnic origins”.
In fact, Wilson’s example only highlights the force of the question he derides. What does he mean by 
criticising harshly? As Justice Bromberg made clear in his decision in Eatock v Bolt (2011), section 18C does 
not prohibit anyone from critically discussing aspects of Aboriginal identity and tradition. Were Wilson’s 
“harsh” criticism to be reasonably made – for example, by suggesting that if Aboriginal law condemns 
homosexuality, it is homophobic and discriminatory in just the way that Christianity, Judaism and Islam 
traditionally are – there would be no issue even if the remark upsets some Indigenous Australians. Were his 
“harsh” criticism to condemn Aboriginal law and culture in their entirety, Wilson might have a problem. 
However, then he would have succumbed to the rub of the “party trick” question.
The chilling effect is most pernicious not when there are things that some people are just itching to say 
but which would put them in jeopardy under sections 18C and 18D. Discouraging racist and discriminatory 
behaviour is the very point of these provisions. Rather, the concern about the chilling effect is that 
regulating speech may discourage people from publicly engaging in controversial issues even when what 
they have to say may be valuable and perfectly legitimate as far as the law is concerned. The concern, in 
other words, is that a climate of political correctness is created in which people “walk on egg shells” or, 
worse, simply disengage.
Three points are worth making about this concern. First, the psychology and sociology behind such 
“chilling” effects are well documented. People do routinely anticipate and assess the likely consequences 
in managing their choices and conduct. In political science, the theory of anticipated reactions identifies a 
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that his government would no longer pursue changes to the RDA, saying “Leadership is about preserving 
national unity on the essentials and that is why I have taken this position” (Aston 2014b).
For some advocates of the government’s proposed reform, such as the Attorney General, the issue 
was a matter of principle. Free speech, in their view, is simply too fundamental to liberty and democracy 
to be balanced against protection from discriminatory action of any kind. However, other advocates of the 
reform were primarily concerned about the insidious consequences of regulating speech. For them, such 
a regulation makes people overcautious about speaking their mind, introducing a “chilling” effect that 
drains public discourse of authenticity, which in turn undermines democratic legitimacy. This concern 
is the mirror image of the concern that certain kinds of speech can intimidate minority members from 
participating in the society as equals. In either case, is not a full and frank ICD made impossible?
This important issue was lost in the public debate. Those opposed to amending the RDA provisions 
sometimes challenged the reformers by asking, “What is it that you want to say that isn’t already protected 
under section 18D?” (Soutphommasane 2014). It is a fair question, but it does not tackle the issue of the 
chilling effect. Sensing this, Commissioner Wilson (2015) rather unkindly called the question a “party 
trick”. “The question assumes that one wants to say something racist, but that is not so”, he protested. 
As an example, Wilson cited his own self-censorship on hearing the boxer Anthony Mundine say that 
Aboriginality and homosexuality are incompatible according to Aboriginal law. Wilson said that he wanted 
to “harshly criticise” the basis of Mundine’s comment but because of section 18C, he and other non-
Aboriginal Australians “have to cautiously discuss the topic” lest they offend Mundine’s “ethnic origins”.
In fact, Wilson’s example only highlights the force of the question he derides. What does he mean by 
criticising harshly? As Justice Bromberg made clear in his decision in Eatock v Bolt (2011), section 18C does 
not prohibit anyone from critically discussing aspects of Aboriginal identity and tradition. Were Wilson’s 
“harsh” criticism to be reasonably made – for example, by suggesting that if Aboriginal law condemns 
homosexuality, it is homophobic and discriminatory in just the way that Christianity, Judaism and Islam 
traditionally are – there would be no issue even if the remark upsets some Indigenous Australians. Were his 
“harsh” criticism to condemn Aboriginal law and culture in their entirety, Wilson might have a problem. 
However, then he would have succumbed to the rub of the “party trick” question.
The chilling effect is most pernicious not when there are things that some people are just itching to say 
but which would put them in jeopardy under sections 18C and 18D. Discouraging racist and discriminatory 
behaviour is the very point of these provisions. Rather, the concern about the chilling effect is that 
regulating speech may discourage people from publicly engaging in controversial issues even when what 
they have to say may be valuable and perfectly legitimate as far as the law is concerned. The concern, in 
other words, is that a climate of political correctness is created in which people “walk on egg shells” or, 
worse, simply disengage.
Three points are worth making about this concern. First, the psychology and sociology behind such 
“chilling” effects are well documented. People do routinely anticipate and assess the likely consequences 
in managing their choices and conduct. In political science, the theory of anticipated reactions identifies a 
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key dimension of power (Bachrach & Baratz 1970; Lukes 1974). For example, presidents and prime ministers 
sometimes decline to bring a legislative bill to a vote if they think they lack the numbers to have it passed. 
Employees will often not vent a grievance at a meeting with the boss if they fear a tirade or retribution. Joe 
and Josephine Citizen might not publicly engage on contentious issues if they anticipate a public brawl or 
legal ramifications. These effects are elementary, mundane, and real.
Second, the idea that sections 18C and 18D of the RDA have created in Australia just such a generalised 
and pernicious chilling effect seems fanciful. On this argument, Australian public discourse has been 
artificially impoverished through self-censorship and been less than robust since 1995. Such propositions 
fly in the face of evidence. For example, when Howard came to power in 1996, there was much talk by 
him and his government of how for too long Australians had been living under the scourge of political 
correctness, unable or unwilling to speak their mind for fear of offending minorities. Although Part 2A was 
added to the RDA in the year prior to Howard’s coming to power, the next half decade saw the xenophobic 
phenomena of Pauline Hanson and Hansonism.3 Nothing in the RDA prevented people from speaking their 
minds, often in ugly ways. Nothing in the RDA prevented Hanson from being elected to the Senate in 2016 
and from continuing to rail against particular minorities.
Third, those who believe that section 18C does have a generalised and pernicious chilling effect need 
a better cause célèbre than the Andrew Bolt case. As one of the most read columnists in the country and 
a man who, in the aftermath of his legal entanglement with the RDA, was handed his own public affairs 
television program, Bolt is hardly a compelling example of the way section 18C silences people. The 
general public seemed instinctively to appreciate this in overwhelmingly withholding their support of the 
government’s reforms.
Any semblance of symmetry between ordinary folk being intimidated by section 18C from speaking 
their minds and minorities being intimidated by hate speech is not borne out by the circumstances. 
Importantly, this does not mean that the current racial hatred provisions should be the last word on the 
matter. Soon after the racial hatred provisions were added to the RDA in 1995, then Race Discrimination 
Commissioner Zita Antonios oversaw a review of the legislation. It asked probing questions about 
whether the right balance between protection from discrimination and free speech had been struck (Race 
Discrimination Commissioner 1995, 1996). Such a review should be ongoing. For example, a case can be 
made that the words “offend” and “insult” in the section 18C provisions are, semantically, too sensitive. In 
the RDA, they operate together with other criteria in the context of discrimination to form a “high bar” for 
legislative purview. No one merely insulted or taking offense can seek relief under the Act. Nevertheless, 
these terms lend themselves to public misunderstanding, frivolous and opportunistic complaints and 
polemical mischief.
The 2016 national election saw Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (who had earlier replaced Abbott 
in a Liberal Party leadership spill) and the Liberal–National Coalition retain majority government by a 
single seat. Soon after, a group of conservative and libertarian parliamentarians sought to put reform 
of section 18C back on the agenda. This time the quest was to have the words “offend” and “insult” 
removed from the anti-vilification provisions (Lewis 2016). Turnbull initially refused to revisit the issue 
given his predecessor’s debacle. After further agitation by some conservative colleagues, he agreed to a 
parliamentary inquiry into freedom of speech in Australia.4 The inquiry did not ultimately recommend 
major changes to the race hate laws (Hunter 2017). Turnbull nevertheless acceded to calls within his party 
to replace the words “offend, insult, humiliate” in 18C with “harass”, while retaining “intimidate”. The 
government proposed once again that a “reasonable member of the Australian community” standard be 
applied to establishing contraventions of 18C instead of a member of the targeted community, as currently 
3  Pauline Hanson is a populist, rightwing politician who was first elected to the parliament as an independent candidate in 
1996. The following year, she founded Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, whose party platform was anti-immigration, anti-mul-
ticulturalism, anti-Asians, anti-“handouts” to Aborigines, and Australia for white Anglo-Celtic Australians. After some initial 
electoral success in the late 1990s, her and her party’s fortunes withered. She was elected to the Australian Senate in 2016 after 
almost two decades of unsuccessfully seeking re-election. Her main target today is Muslims and Islam.
4  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights Inquiry, 2016: freedom of speech in Australia.
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applies (Grattan 2017). In an extraordinary move, the government announced these proposed changes on 
Harmony Day, a longstanding multicultural initiative to combat racism and to promote social cohesion. 
Held on 21 March, the day coincides with the United Nations International Day for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. Community leaders were critical of the changes and scathing about the timing (Malone 
2017). In the end, the proposed reforms were rejected in the Senate.
The irony and shame of this protracted free speech episode is that had the Abbott government sought 
a modest reform of the words “offend” and “insult” in the first place, in proper consultation with ethnic 
minorities, it might well have won the day. Instead of riding roughshod over minorities’ concerns, a genuine 
attempt at ICD could have bequeathed sensible improvements to the current racial hatred provisions. All 
Australians are arguably the poorer for this missed opportunity in ICD.
4  Conclusion
The proposition that multiculturalism stands in the way of meaningful ICD is increasingly advanced in 
international scholarly and policy discourse. The Australian experience does not support this proposition. 
The main obstacle to ICD in Australia has been a powerful current of Anglo-Australian indifference, if 
not condescension, towards cultural minorities and their place in the Australian society. Australian 
multiculturalism was meant to check Anglo-Australian dominance but remains challenged by it.
All Australian governments too often ignore the concerns of cultural minorities in formulating policy 
that directly bears on them. In this, they flout the spirit and the terms of Australian multiculturalism. 
Minorities also have a responsibility to respect these terms. The two case studies considered in this paper 
– the federal government’s flagging of a proposed citizenship test and its attempt to reform the RDA – 
suggest that far from undermining ICD, respecting the terms of Australian multiculturalism would help to 
make it possible. Moreover, these cases suggest that if implemented, ICD could contribute improved policy 
outcomes for all Australians. ICD is not only possible under a multiculturalism regime. It is also made 
possible by a multiculturalism regime such as Australia and, indeed, is required by such a regime if the 
latter is to be successful.
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